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ABSTRACT 
The United States is currently involved in stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
and will likely continue this involvement in the future.  Currently, general-purpose 
forces, the majority of which are U.S. Army soldiers, conduct these operations.  As of 
this writing, the U.S. Army has resisted establishing a standing, dedicated, stability 
operations force.  Such a force would, at first glance, seem to be a logical progression of 
American military force structure, based upon current Department of Defense directives 
and publicly stated policy.  This thesis will explore the reasons behind the lack of this 
force.  It will analyze costs and benefits of a stability operations force with regards to 
military readiness, domestic politics, and international politics.  It will also consider the 
role of organization inertia.  Finally, it will recommend a workable framework for such a 
stability operations force, using the lessons learned from the analysis within this thesis, 
making the most of the advantages described and mitigating the costs. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Why has the United States not established a standing stability operations force?  
Why has it not established a dedicated training pipeline for troops involved in stability 
operations?  The United States, and its military in particular, has had a long history of 
adapting to meet new challenges.  This adaptation has often resulted in new, specialized 
forces.  At the very least, troop training has grown and improved, resulting in a better-
prepared fighting force.  As of now, the U.S. has resisted establishing a standing, 
dedicated, stability operations force.  It has also resisted creating any sort of specialized 
career path for service members within this field.  For the purpose of this thesis, a 
“standing stability operations force” is defined as a specialized organization within the 
military, dedicated to the sole mission of conducting stability operations.  The potential 
size and composition of this force will be described in Chapter IV. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
Since the end of the Cold War Era, there has been a significant increase in “small 
conflicts,” including: contingency operations, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and 
similar armed struggles.1  The causes and initial circumstances surrounding these actions 
are varied; however, the risks following this initial conflict are great.  Civil wars are 
costly.  A typical civil war can cost a small country and its neighbors around $64.2 
billion.2  International intervention into the conflicts in Bosnia, Cambodia, El Salvador, 
Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia has cost approximately $85 billion dollars.3  According to a 
recent survey of Oxford University economists, a UN Chapter VII-style peace operation 
                                                 
1 Trevor Findlay, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
124. 
2 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War, 
Copenhagen Consensus Challenge Paper, Department of Economics: Center for the Study of African 
Economies, Oxford University (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Consensus, 2004), 8. 
3 Ibid., 8. 
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is the most cost-effective way to prevent further conflicts.4  The U.S. has been involved 
in many of these conflicts, started a few, been in leadership roles in others, and generally 
footed a great portion of the bill.5  Department of Defense Instruction 3000.5 stresses that 
stability operations “are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall 
be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.”6  Therefore, it 
stands to reason that it is in the best interest of the U.S. to find the most effective way to 
prepare for and execute these stability missions.  The question posed above is made even 
more puzzling by the fact that many American allies themselves have standing stability 
operations forces.7  Additionally, Charles C. Moskos has argued that soldiers engaged in 
stability operations actually are better and more capable soldiers than those who lack 
such experience.8 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES  
What reasons exist for this resistance to a specialized stability operations force?  
Any military’s primary mission is to fight and win a nation’s wars.9  Soldiers and 
Marines often view themselves as heroes, who “reduced war to its simplest terms—as 
armed violence directed toward the achievement of an end.”10  Hence, a “warrior ethos” 
is held in a high regard.  Stability operations, however, can be, and often are, viewed as a 
lesser mission than warfighting.  General Colin Powell, at his last press conference as the  
 
                                                 
4 Collier and Hoeffler, The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War, 22. 
5 Edward M. Spiers, “U.S. Peace Operations: The Transition Continues,” in Major Powers and 
Peacekeeping: Perspectives, Priorities and the Challenges of Military Intervention, (Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2006), 15. 
6 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05: Stability Operations 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2009). 
7 Franklin C. Pinch, “Canada: Managing Change with Shrinking Resources,” in The Post Modern 
Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War, ed. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. 
Segal, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 160. 
8 Charles C. Moskos, Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1976), 137. 
9 Robert M. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a 
Postconflict Stability Force (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004), 238. 
10 Biran McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2007), 6. 
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed concerns regarding an overemphasis on 
peacekeeping.  He said that such a focus could weaken the warrior ethos necessary for the 
military to complete its primary mission.11   
Another reason for the lack of a standardized stability operations force may be the 
simple fact that the U.S. historically has not placed a high priority on such operations.  
However, emphasis is shifting within the U.S. military.  Department of Defense 
Instruction 3000.05 is entitled “Stability Operations.”  It addresses the full spectrum of 
post-conflict and small-scale operations.12  This instruction is important, as it shows that 
the military understands the environment in which it operates, and the necessity for post-
conflict prowess and skill.   
The preliminary hypothesis for this thesis is that the resistance to establishing a 
standing stability operations force and training track is two-fold.  The first justification is 
a cost-benefit analysis, drawing on rational choice theory.  The leadership involved in 
shaping force structure have examined the costs associated with establishing such a force, 
weighed those costs against the benefits, and ultimately decided that the status quo was 
the most beneficial course of action.  The costs involved could be political (both 
domestically and internationally), economic, and/or military.  These costs may or may 
not be simply perception, or perhaps, upon further analysis, the costs are not as great as 
expected.   
This problem of perception leads to the second potential reason for resistance.  
This hypothesis examines the extent to which organizational inertia and path dependence 
have influenced U.S. policy toward establishing a standing stability operations force.  
The Army in particular, as an institution, is so big and unyielding that it is unable or 
unwilling to undergo major changes.  Path dependency may be a significant governing 
factor in the modern Army’s decision-making process. 
                                                 
11 Spiers, “U.S. Peace Operations,” 16. 
12 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction. 
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on the subject of this thesis can be separated into several major 
camps.  First it is important to examine existing doctrine.  The American military has 
outlines of several aspects of stability operations.  Joint Publication 3-0 defines “Stability 
Operations” thusly: 
These missions, tasks, and activities seek to maintain or reestablish a safe 
and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, 
emergency infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitarian relief. Many of 
these missions and tasks are the essence of CMO. To reach the national 
strategic end state and conclude the operation/campaign successfully, 
JFCs must integrate and synchronize stability operations with other 
operations (offense and defense) within each major operation or campaign 
phase. Stability operations support USG plans for stability, security, 
transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations and likely will be 
conducted in coordination with and in support of HN authorities, OGAs, 
IGOs, and/or NGOs, and the private sector.13 
More specifically, the U.S. Army’s Field Manual on Stability Operations outlines 
in detail its own particular doctrine:  “[FM 3-07] proceeds from that definition to 
establish the broad context in which military forces assume that role before, during, and 
after combat operations, across the spectrum of conflict.”14  Each of these publications 
refers to the Department of Defense Instruction 3000.5 on Stability Operations.  FM 3-07 
acknowledges, “the [Department of Defense] directive elevated stability operations to a 
status equal to that of the offense and defense. That fundamental change in emphasis sets 
the foundation for this doctrine.”15  Finally, the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR) also addresses stability operations as a core mission of the U.S. military.  It states: 
“The Department defends the United States from direct attack, deters potential 
adversaries, fosters regional security, and assures access to the global commons by  
 
                                                 
13 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2008), V-I.Washington, DC 
14 U.S. Army Headquarters, Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of the Army, 2008), vi. Carlisle, PA 
15 Ibid., vi.  
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enhancing U.S. capabilities to train, advise, and assist partner-nation security forces and 
contribute to coalition and peacekeeping operations.”16 Additionally, the 2010 QDR 
states: 
The wars we are fighting today and assessments of the future security 
environment together demand that the United States retain and enhance a 
whole-of-government capability to succeed in large-scale 
counterinsurgency (COIN), stability, and counterterrorism (CT) 
operations[…], Moreover, there are few cases in which the U.S. Armed 
Forces would engage in sustained large-scale combat operations without 
the associated need to assist in the transition to just and stable governance. 
Accordingly, the U.S. Armed Forces will continue to require capabilities 
to create a secure environment in fragile states in support of local 
authorities and, if necessary, to support civil authorities in providing 
essential government services, restoring emergency infrastructure, and 
supplying humanitarian relief.  
It is clear that the U.S. Department of Defense, at least on paper, places a high 
priority on stability operations.   
Despite this written support for stability operations, and the priority placed on 
such, there remains a debate as to whether or not such an emphasis is indeed good for the 
armed forces.17  A great deal has been written on the subject, both for and against 
separation and special emphasis on stability operations.  Nathan Freier argues that in a 
world of “hybrid warfare,” the military must always be ready for multiple types of threats 
and missions.  He writes: “It is difficult to classify DOD’s strategic focus today. Defense 
capabilities are placed into action to secure vulnerable core interests for a variety of 
reasons, under wide-ranging circumstances.”18  Army doctrine seems to agree with this 
concept.  U.S. Army FM 3-07 emphasizes such concepts as: “whole of government,”19 
“comprehensive approach,”20 and stability operations as simply one aspect of “full 
                                                 
16 Robert Gates, “Quadrennial Defense Review,” (Washington, DC: Department of Defesne), 13.  
17 Charles C. Moskos, “Toward a Postmodern Military: The United States as a Paradigm,” in The 
Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War, ed. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and 
David R. Segal, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 17. 
18 Nathan Freier, “The Defense Identity Crisis: It’s a Hybrid World,” Parameters 39, no. 3 (Autumn 
2009): 81–94, 83.  
19 FM 3-07, 1-4.  
20 Ibid. 
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spectrum operations.”21  Support for an integrated force is demonstrated perhaps most 
clearly and forcefully in the 2010 QDR.  This document identifies, as some of the highest 
priorities of the Department of Defense, the goals to: “Increase COIN, stability 
operations, and CT competency and capacity in general purpose forces.”22  On the other 
hand, others have stated clearly that a separate force would have significant military 
advantages.  Robert M. Perito describes an ideal stability operations force as including 
military police and Stryker brigades, along with special police units, civil police, and 
judicial and penal experts.23  Finally, in 1999, the Congressional Budget Office compiled 
a report on peace operations and combat effectiveness.  It explored costs concerning 
several options to improve both combat effectiveness and peace operations capabilities.  
It concluded: 
As long as the Army must deploy often to peace operations, it will 
continue to run the risk of being less ready for conventional combat than it 
would be otherwise. If that level of risk is considered unacceptable, 
decision makers may face a choice: either increase funding enough to 
provide the means for responding to peace operations while maintaining 
readiness for conventional war, or decrease U.S. commitments to peace 
operations.24 
However, others have acknowledged that military costs are not the only factor 
likely contributing to America’s lack of a standing stability operations force.  Michael G. 
MacKinnon outlined the gradual shift of public sentiment regarding peacekeeping, a key 
component of stability operations.  Thoughts of the Vietnam War were still in the minds 
of many, and they were unwilling to use the military for what could be seen as misguided 
goals, at best.25  President George H. W. Bush’s actions early in his presidency (the 
invasion of Panama and the Gulf War) seem to support the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, 
                                                 
21 FM 3-07, 2-1. 
22 Gates, “Quadrennial Defense Review,” 24. 
23 Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger, 330–333. 
24 Congressional Budget Office, “Making Peace While Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of 
U.S. Military Participation in Peace Operations,” CBO Paper (1999), 64. 
25 Michael G. MacKinnon, The Evolution of U.S. Peacekeeping Policy Under Clinton (London: Frank 
Cass, 2000), 13. 
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that is, only use overwhelming force and only use it towards a clear goal.26  Kimberly 
Zisk Marten described the problems, risks, and failures associated with the lack of 
American political will to engage fully in peace [stability] operations.27  “[T]he United 
States military tries to avoid taking on police-like functions as much as possible, at least 
in part to avoid casualties on missions like peacekeeping that are considered less central 
to U.S. security concerns than war-fighting.”28  Planners have determined that one of 
their goals is “maintaining public support for military action by limiting the perception 
that troops are put in harm’s way for no good reason.”29  One major cause of these 
perceptions was, and continues to be, the memory of the UN operations in Somalia.30 
Domestic political concerns, however, are not the only area of debate on the 
subject of stability operations.  International politics are always at play when talking 
about international actions.  Perito lays out several arguments supporting the U.S. 
fighting (and winning) wars, and letting its allies conduct the post-conflict and 
peacekeeping operations.31  The general consensus on peacekeeping is that the UN leads 
the charge on this function around the world.  In fact, peacekeeping is “the mission which 
is, indeed, [the UN’s] very raison d’être.”32  However, even the UN has had its stumbling 
blocks.  The famed “Brahimi Report” was commissioned in order to help the UN 
complete that mission.  Throughout the 1990s, “the United Nations has repeatedly failed 
to meet the challenge.”33  Part of the difficulty faced by UN forces after the Cold War era 
was the changing aspects of peacekeeping.  The Brahimi report defined “Peace 
Operations” as consisting of three main activities: peacemaking, i.e., actions to bring an 
end to a conflict in progress; peacekeeping, i.e., many groups (including the military) 
                                                 
26 MacKinnon, The Evolution of U.S. Peacekeeping, 15. 
27 Kimberly Zisk Marten, Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004), 102. 
28 Ibid., 104. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 105. 
31 Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger, 250–255. 
32 Lakhdar Brahimi, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations (New York: United Nations, 2000), xv. 
33 Ibid., viii. 
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“working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars”; and peace 
building, i.e., the bulk of actions following a conflict, aimed at establishing conditions 
conducive to sustaining a lasting peace.34  The U.S. was willing to engage in the 
peacemaking part, but not the peacekeeping and peace building processes.  American 
political leaders preferred to leave that to the UN, NATO, the EU, and other allied 
forces.35  Complications arose, however, when this plan was put into practice.  Prior to 
UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), UN’s Chapter VII interventions were clearly 
either a UN- or U.S.-led operation where force was authorized when necessary.36  The 
failures of this mission have been tied to “the folly of reaching impetuously for too many 
objectives at once... especially when a firm hold on the nettle looked like involving more 
casualties and a long-drawn out campaign.”37  
Finally, much has been written on the institutional, social, and bureaucratic nature 
of the Army itself that might make it resistant to the development of a standing stability 
operations force.  John H. Faris explains that the U.S. military is not operating at optimal 
levels due to the “preeminence of bureaucratic rationalism in planning and managing the 
all-volunteer force…”38 The military’s bureaucratic system, he says, is so stubborn and 
unyielding that it has adversely affected morale, cohesion, and effectiveness.39  Brian 
McAllister Linn has written about the Army’s painful lessons after the Korean War.  The 
Army used those lessons and “the Army leadership would take as a mantra ‘No More 
Task Force Smiths.’”40  The Army was concerned that post-conflict reconstruction in 
Europe and Japan had softened its forces, and felt that it must always be ready for full 
                                                 
34 Brahimi, Report of the Panel on United Nations, 2–3. 
35 Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger, 255. 
36 Anthony Parsons, From Cold War to Hot Peace: UN Interventions 1947-1995 (London: Penguin 
Books, 1995), 206. 
37 Ibid., 207. 
38 John H. Faris, “The Social Psychology of Military Service and the Influence of Bureaucratic 
Rationalism,” in The Military: More Than Just a Job?, eds. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood, 
(Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1988), 68. 
39 Faris, “The Social Psychology of Military Service,” 69. 
40 Task Force Smith was LTC Charles B Smith’s undermanned and poorly equipped command that 
was easily overrun by the North Koreans. Linn, The Echo of Battle, 163.   
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combat.41  Perito writes of this attitude continuing today, explaining the prevailing 
opinions of current officers:  “US military leaders believed their job was to ‘fight and win 
the nation’s wars.’  Participation in peace operations dulled combat skills, expended 
resources, exhausted troops and equipment, and reduced readiness.”42 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
To understand past and current American resistance to a standing stability 
operations force of any stripe, this thesis will rely on a qualitative analysis of primary and 
secondary sources.  Key primary sources will include current military doctrine (both joint 
and service-specific), training instructions, public speeches, and Congressional reports.  
Secondary sources will be used to evaluate various aspects of stability operations and 
American participation in them, including academic papers, journalistic sources, and 
scholarly books.  Comparisons will be made between American and the United Nations 
involvement in peacekeeping, as well as apparent disconnects between stated policies and 
actual execution. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this thesis will be to determine the political, economic, military, 
and social reasons behind American resistance to establishing a standing stability 
operations force.  It will initially present the historical context for the importance of 
stability operations. It will make the case that the U.S. has been involved in stability 
operations for years, the involvement continues today, and that involvement will continue 
for the foreseeable future.  It will examine recent and current policy and doctrine, 
showing a shift in policy, doctrine, and implementation thereof.  It will also show a break 
in the apparently logical progression of stability operations development: the absence of a 
standing stability operations force. 
 
                                                 
41 Linn, The Echo of Battle, 163. 
42 Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger, 238. 
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Next, the reasons for this break will be examined.  First, this thesis will examine 
the cost-benefit hypothesis presented above.  It will analyze various arguments 
concerning military, political, economic, and geo-political costs concerning a standing 
stability operations force.  It will also examine various theories as to the possible 
mitigation of these costs, and potential benefits that could be gained in each area 
concerned.  
The thesis will then examine organizational inertia as a possible explanation of 
the American resistance to establishing a stability operations force.  It will explore the 
prevailing attitudes in today’s Army and Department of Defense.  It will identify the 
validity of various points of view, and the impact each has on both the development and 
the actual implementation of policy.   
Finally, the thesis will propose a structure for a stability operations force, using 
lessons learned from the previous chapters to emphasize the benefits of such a force and 
mitigate the costs.  It will then conclude with the most likely and influential causes of 
American resistance to establishing a standing stability operations force.  
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II. HISTORICAL NARRATIVE: EVOLUTION OF STABILITY 
OPERATIONS 
When examining the motivations and prejudices of decision makers, it is 
important to examine the historical context in which they work.  This chapter will present 
salient aspects of the history of American involvement in stability operations, and how 
that involvement has changed over time.  It will then analyze the current state of stability 
operations, both in doctrine and practice, and will identify any disconnect in American 
policy and execution.  
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The United States has a long history of conducting stability operations, at nearly 
every level of involvement and in every corner of the world.  However, the degree of 
emphasis placed on these operations has varied, as has their success.  An examination of 
the forces used in these operations, their specific missions, and their level of success is 
key to understanding the attitudes and opinions of decision-makers today. 
1. Pre-Cold War Operations 
American involvement in stability operations is not new to this generation, or to 
the past century.  American constabulary forces have operated in Cuba and the 
Philippines as early as 1898, followed by several other campaigns: Panama, Nicaragua, 
Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.43  American occupation of the Philippines was one of 
the greatest challenges faced by American forces at the turn of the century.  An active 
war broke out in February of 1899 and lasted more than two years, leaving 4,234 
American and 16,000 Filipino soldiers dead, along with more than 200,000 civilians.44  
Though separate from the fighting in other parts of the Philippines by both distance and 
culture, Mindanao presented the U.S. Army with its first real experience with 
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constabulary- and stability-type operations in a predominantly Muslim area.  American 
forces actively intervened in the affairs of the locals: “slavery was outlawed, schools that 
taught a non-Muslim curriculum were established, and local governments that challenged 
the authority of traditional community leaders were organized. A new legal system 
replaced the sharia, or Islamic law.”45  Because of these actions, “United States rule, even 
more than that of the Spanish, was seen as a challenge to Islam. Armed resistance grew, 
and the Moro province remained under United States military rule until 1914, by which 
time the major Muslim groups had been subjugated.”46 
The intent and missions of other American operations were varied.  In Cuba, the 
military’s main role was to maintain law and order during the occupation following the 
expulsion of the Spanish.  In Panama, the U.S. military became that country’s only armed 
protection following the revolution and independence from Colombia.  The Panamanians 
knew they could rely upon the U.S. for protection because of the Canal Zone.47  The U.S. 
Marine Corps mission in Nicaragua was originally to protect the U.S. legation there, but 
grew (under pressure from the Nicaraguan government) to develop and lead a national 
constabulary.48  The Dominican Republic was effectively invaded and taken over by the 
U.S. military following a major insurrection against the ruling government.  Again, the 
Marines were charged with developing and leading a national, modern constabulary.49  
Finally, in Haiti, the Marines were once again called upon to occupy and run the country, 
with the specific goal of establishing “an indigenous security force that would put an end 
to Haiti’s history of repeated military insurrections.”50 
The forces used in each of these interventions were also varied from the start, and 
evolved throughout the course of the early Twentieth Century.  American actions in Cuba 
provided perhaps the strongest call for at dedicated stability operations force, or at least a 
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constabulary corps.  Brigadier General Leonard Wood established a constabulary that 
would eventually become the Cuban Rural Guard.  This force “was dressed and equipped 
to resemble the U.S. Cavalry, but its duties ranged from suppression of banditry to 
executing court orders and investigating crimes, accidents, and arson.”51  The success of 
this force even inspired Secretary of War Russell Alger to recommend a similar force for 
Puerto Rico and the Philippines.52  However, in the other campaigns that followed, U.S. 
Marines provided the bulk of the leadership (and often forces) involved with constabulary 
and stability operations.   
Finally, the success (or, more accurately, lack thereof) of these missions was 
directly influenced by American policies and priorities.  “Even though […] the United 
States […] believed at the turn of the twentieth century that [its] colonies were important 
to [its] security interests, [its] foreign policy attention was focused elsewhere.”53  While 
places like Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti were not “colonies” exactly, 
the principle still holds.  The Nicaraguan occupation was ended in 1933 by President 
Hoover’s concerns about such operations during the Great Depression.54  Without 
American support, the Nicaraguan government fell to a coup three years later.  Similarly, 
the government installed by the U.S. in the Dominican Republic was taken over by 
political maneuvering following American troop withdrawal.55  Lastly, American training 
worked perhaps too well in Haiti.  U.S. Marines built and trained the Garde d'Haiti, 
which “evolved into the Forces Armees d’Haiti and the gardes-champetres into the 
attaches that were the primary targets of Operation Uphold Democracy, the U.S.-led 
Multinational Force intervention in Haiti in 1994.”56  The continued military dominance 
of the civilian leadership there was certainly an unintended consequence of American 
intervention. 
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2. Cold War Era 
Following World War II, Americans saw a vastly different geopolitical situation.  
The Soviet Union now posed the greatest threat to American power and interests, and to 
Capitalist ideals the world over.  Stability operations in such a bi-polar environment were 
vastly different in scope and intent than those that had come before. 
a. The U.S. Constabulary in Germany 
Germany was in bad shape following its defeat in 1945.  “Germany had no 
government.  Its economy and infrastructure were in ruins.  People were hungry.  The 
country was spotted with camps for displaced persons and refugees.”57  General Dwight 
D. Eisenhower amended General George C. Marshall’s plan for occupation of post-war 
Japan to fit it to Europe.  He believed that the best way to maintain order was to establish 
a force “composed entirely of American military personnel.”58  The War Department 
ordered the establishment of this corps, and that it be modeled after state police forces in 
the U.S.59   
It is important and interesting to note here that this constabulary was 
initially built out of the best of the best of the units within the European theater, but then 
clearly separated from the main warfighting force.  The soldiers were trained in 
Germany, and were outfitted with their own special insignia on their uniforms.60  The 
leadership at the time believed it was important to identify this stability force as different 
from their warfighting brethren.  This differentiation was done despite the fact that the 
clear purpose of the Marshall Plan was not simply maintaining peace and order in post-
war Germany, but also a “defensive step, taken to prevent Soviet expansion into Western 
Europe.”61   
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b. Post-War Japan and Korea 
Troops in Japan following the surrender were not given the same 
advantages or respect.  “Since Japan surrendered prior to the entry of U.S. forces, the 
United States established a military administration but left the emperor and the Japanese 
government in place.”62  However, even though Japanese police fulfilled all of their 
normal functions, “From September 1945 to April 1949, Occupation duties required the 
full attention of the maneuver formations of the Eight Army.”63  The Americans 
attempted to reduce the role of traditional police by dividing up the force into separate 
agencies that would handle customs, census taking, intelligence gathering, and other tasks 
separately.64  General MacArthur defined the priorities of the Eighth Army as first 
performing those occupation duties, then supporting other U.S. policies and interests in 
Japan, and lastly preparing for a major war.65  They were clearly not prepared for the 
Soviet threat that showed itself in Korea.66  “Army strategists had been convinced, as 
were their political superiors, that the primary danger was a Warsaw Pact attack on 
Western Europe.  They had paid little attention to the Far East and even less to peripheral 
areas.”67  The American troops’ lack of preparation again showed the results an 
American foreign policy that is focused elsewhere.  North Korean forces crossed the 
thirty-eighth parallel less than five years after the war ended in Japan.  General 
MacArthur was forced to order the Twenty-fourth Infantry Division from Japan to Korea.  
This division had been barely a skeleton as late as 1949; while it trained in earnest, it had 
very little time to prepare for a war.68  One small task force from that Division, Task 
Force Smith, was the first to face the Koreans.  This force of 514 men was also the first to 
face crushing defeat, as they were outnumbered fifteen to one and using antiquated World 
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War II weapons against advanced Soviet tanks.69  This failure became a rallying cry for 
those opposed to training soldiers for anything other than major combat operations: “No 
more Task Force Smiths.”70 
c. UN Peacekeeping Takes Center Stage 
The conflict in Korea marked the first major action of the United Nations, 
and, arguably, its largest ever.  However, the remaining years of the Cold War Era saw 
numerous, smaller actions headed by the UN.  Peacekeeping became the main security 
function of the UN, and these missions generally consisted of monitoring cease-fires and 
neutral buffer zones between belligerents.71  The United States, following the 
unsatisfactory end to the Korean conflict, was happy to let the UN handle those missions.  
Peacekeeping, as one aspect of stability operations, had no place in a post-Korea Army.  
As such, U.S. involvement in UN operations, and stability operations in general, was very 
limited throughout the Cold War.  “From 1948 to 1978, the United Nations established 
only thirteen peacekeeping and observer missions, with the United States assigning 
military observers in Palestine (1948) and Lebanon (1978).”72  The Army had 
reorganized and built itself up to the point of incredible confidence, identifying itself as a 
viable option to a conflict with the Soviet Union that would lead to mutual nuclear 
annihilation.73   
However, “[b]y 1969, when the army was mired in a bloody, divisive, and 
corrupting conflict in Southeast Asia, such hubris was long gone.”74  The conflict in 
Vietnam shook up the Army, but it responded by simply moving its focus back to a 
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European fight.75  “Army involvement in counterinsurgency was first seen as an 
aberration and then as a mistake to be avoided. Instead of focusing on the proper 
synchronization of military and political tools with objectives necessary for success in 
low intensity unconventional conflicts, the Army continued to concentrate on mid to high 
intensity conventional wars.”76  From the media, to the politicians, to the public, it was 
everyone else’s fault but their own, and hence they had no real need to change from their 
earlier doctrine.77  The Army “knew” that it was strong, and that it could not afford to 
weaken itself again with anything smacking of stability operations or even a constabulary 
force.78 
3. From Cold War to September 11, 2001 
The fall of the Soviet Union officially ended the Cold War Era and signaled the 
opportunity for a shift in American and military priorities and strategies.  Without a 
major foe always in the picture, the military could lessen its focus on major combat 
operations with a peer-level power; however, the Weinberger-Powell doctrine still 
became the policy of the United States.  This doctrine reflected the military finally 
examining the failure of Vietnam and putting those lessons (along with lessons from 
Beirut) to good use.79  The Weinberger-Powell doctrine outlined six major tests that must 
be applied before using military force: 
1) Vital interests must be at stake; 2) overwhelming force must be used so 
as to ensure victory (i.e., no half-hearted use of the military); 3) objectives, 
both political and military, must be clear; 4) proper resources must be 
made available, and if the situation on the ground changes, the force 
structure must be adapted; 5) before troops were deployed, there must be 
bipartisan support from Congress and from the American people; and 6) 
the use of armed force should be the last resort.80 
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This policy “implicitly did not incorporate the direct use of U.S. military 
personnel in peace operations.”81 Despite extolling the virtues of this doctrine, the U.S. 
operated in several campaigns throughout the 1990s that could be categorized, at least 
partially, as stability operations.  
The first major test of the doctrine post-Cold War Era was the U.S.-led UN 
intervention into Somalia in 1992 and 1993.  After President Bush realized that simply 
air- and sea-lifting food into Somalia was insufficient, he ordered in thousands of 
Marines and soldiers, reaching a peak number of over 25,000 in country in January of 
1993.82  UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali would have preferred a UN-led mission, 
but the U.S. would only participate if it were in charge.  “[T]he dominance of the 
Weinberger-Powell Doctrine was so complete, no other method of deploying troops 
could be conceived.”83  Crucially, major misunderstandings between the UN and U.S. 
gradually became clear, as the UN intended the force to disarm Somali militias and 
establish a secure environment, whereas the U.S., responding to public outcry over the 
horrible images of starvation and suffering seen on TV, simply wanted to deliver 
humanitarian relief and provide force protection for those operations.84  The Americans 
envisioned the whole mission would last only a few months.85  In retrospect, these 
misunderstandings are fairly clear in origin.  Prior to American entry, the UN Mission in 
Somalia (UNOSOM) was “in disarray.”86  Teenagers in pickup trucks armed with 
machine guns roved freely, and no UN forces could move at all without paying off one or 
more of the various clans.87  So the resolution written to implement the American offer of 
help with the humanitarian mission almost seemed to draw in the U.S. into the larger 
business of stability operations in Somalia by connecting the mission to peacekeeping  
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and post conflict peace-building.  Still, the U.S. stuck to its original plan and led the 
effort to deliver humanitarian goods, leaving the disarmament and other true stability 
operations to the other UN forces. 
UNOSOM II began in May of 1993 (later than the U.S. had intended88), with the 
transition to a new UN mission: “the reconstruction of a member state.”89  Though the 
U.S. drew down its forces to around 4,000 on the ground and 1,300 Marines afloat, 
President Clinton endorsed the plan, giving it some major credibility within the UN 
itself.90  It also marked a major turning point in American policy regarding stability 
operations and state building.  Clinton’s endorsement of UNOSOM II exhibited a clear 
departure from his predecessor’s reluctance to affect the political outcome of the conflict 
in Somalia.91  However, this endorsement was short-lived.  On October 3, 1993, 18 Army 
Rangers were killed and 75 were wounded in Mogadishu, and several bodies were 
dragged through the streets.92  The public reaction to this tragedy, and the American 
government’s response, will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter III.   
The other major American involvement in stability operations during the 1990s 
was the intervention in the Balkans.  Before the Dayton Peace Accord was signed in 
1995, the conflict was, like the Gulf War before it, mostly a conventional small war.  
Following the signing of the Peace Accord, the UN created an International Police Task 
Force (IPTF).  The IPTF was designed to assist in the training and ethnic integration of 
the various police forces acting within Bosnia.93  This force was intentionally very 
different than the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR).  IFOR was the more 
conventional military force operating in Bosnia, “with ground, air, and maritime units 
from NATO and non-NATO countries.”94  At the insistence of the U.S. and European 
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powers, the IPTF was to be unarmed, leaving IFOR as the only legitimate user of force in 
Bosnia.  The NATO leadership feared that if the IPTF were armed, it would create more 
problems for IFOR, and it would be a target of weapons thieves.95  IFOR was intended to 
be the backup for IPTF if necessary.96  However, IFOR was forbidden from using 
military force in support of police functions, unless specifically authorized in the Dayton 
Accords.97  This mismatch of missions, combined with the impotence of the IPTF, meant 
“the international community was unable to accomplish the forcible integration it 
intended.”98  As the IFOR became the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) and later 
Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (KFOR), mandates changed, and the situation improved, but 
only slightly; military forces were reluctant to engage in any sort of police action, and 
coordination with civilians was poor.99 
4. Post-September 11 Operations 
Peace operations, as a subset and integral part of stability operations, were thrust 
into the center of the debate about American foreign policy after the events of September 
11, 2001.100  The first, and still ongoing, challenge was Afghanistan.  After the Taliban 
and al Qaeda fell, the UN authorized the creation of the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF).101  This force, comprised of troops from nineteen countries in 2002, was 
separate from American forces conducting Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), but still 
fell under U.S. control, under the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).  This alignment 
was to ensure the best possible coordination between U.S. and Coalition forces, while 
also maintaining the supremacy of American military (OEF) operations.102  “ISAF’s 
purpose was to provide a ‘breathing space’ during which the Afghans could create their 
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own security forces and judicial system.”103  However, ISAF’s progress was slow until 
the introduction of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in 2003.104  However, the 
U.S. and NATO mission continues in Afghanistan today, with around 100,000 troops in 
country.105  Defense Secretary Robert Gates has categorized the current mission as the 
stabilization of Afghanistan in order to hand over control, not to conduct wholesale 
reconstruction of the entire country.106 
Finally, America’s second major battle in the War on Terror, Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, has led to another massive stability operation.  After President George W. 
Bush’s now-infamous “Mission Accomplished” speech in May of 2003, nearly 145,000 
American troops remained in Iraq.107  These forces certainly had their work cut out for 
them, though.  “As a result of years of neglect and the recent wave of widespread looting, 
Baghdad’s fragile infrastructure ceased to function: electricity failed, potable water 
stopped flowing, and telephone service ceased.”108  These events simply marked the start 
of a years-long stability operation in Iraq.  President Obama recently announced that 
Operation Iraqi Freedom ended officially on August 31, 2010, with the final withdrawal 
of all combat forces, leaving the 50,000 troops in Iraq to help train and support Iraqi 
forces.109   
B. STABILITY OPERATIONS TODAY 
This long and challenging history has helped to shape the current official doctrine 
of the United States’ regarding stability operations.  Several documents provide guidance 
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concerning priorities and best practices.  From Department of Defense-level instructions, 
down to service-specific manuals, the military has attempted to reshape and refine its role 
and tactics in stability operations.  However, the degree of implementation and 
internalization of these doctrines is up for debate. 
1. Department of Defense Instruction 3000.5 
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy issued Department of Defense 
Instruction (DoDI) 3000.5 in September of 2009.  This instruction sets the tone and 
ultimate priorities for the whole U.S. military.  Arguably, the key sentence contained 
within the DoD’s defining document for stability operations is this one: “Stability 
operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be 
prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.”110  This 
prioritization, at least on paper, is unprecedented in American history, and is a clear 
reflection of the realities of modern warfare.  The invasions and defeat of both Saddam 
Hussein’s government in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan each only took less than 
two months, however, as of 2010, tens of thousands of U.S. troops are still stationed 
there, performing stability and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.   
This instruction identifies and clarifies the role of the DoD in stability operations 
with regards to other U.S. agencies and foreign governments and security forces.  It 
identifies the DoD as the lead agency in some area, a partner in others, and subordinate in 
others.  The DoD will lead and conduct efforts to:  
1. Establish civil security and civil control 
2. Restore or provide essential services 
3. Repair critical infrastructure 
4. Provide humanitarian assistance111 
The DoD is a partner agency when planning for stability operations, coordination 
with foreign governments, and building long-term, sustainable host nation capabilities.  
Finally, the DoD shall assist other agencies and foreign governments with regards to: 
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1. Disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating former belligerents into civil 
society. 
2. Rehabilitating former belligerents and units into legitimate security forces. 
3. Strengthening governance and the rule of law. 
4. Fostering economic stability and development.112 
As described above, NATO forces (led by the U.S.) were unwilling to mire 
themselves too deeply into state building and police operations in Bosnia.  Additionally, 
shortsighted and incomplete planning has been blamed for many of the problems in Iraq 
faced by Coalition troops after the initial invasion and push into Baghdad.113  This DoDI 
is ambiguous enough regarding planning and actual stability operations responsibilities 
that, after (or during) stability operations, the DoD can either pat itself on the back for a 
job well done, or pass blame off to another agency, depending on the conditions on the 
ground at the time.  The shrewd politics of this document, and the motivation behind 
them, will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters III and IV.  
2. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations 
The U.S. Army published Field Manual 3-07 (FM 3-07) represents an anticipation 
of the shift in DoD priorities, and also the realities of the wars in which the Army had 
been engaged for the past seven years.  The Army itself regards the document as 
revolutionary.  LTG William B. Caldwell, IV, Commander of the Army Combined Arms 
Center, writes in the Forward, “[FM 3-07] represents a milestone in Army doctrine.  It is 
a roadmap from conflict to peace, a practical guidebook for adaptive, creative leadership 
at a critical time in our history.”114  While this endorsement is reminiscent of the political 
posturing found in DoDI 3000.5, the majority of the document is much more down to 
earth, providing a framework for leadership on the ground as well as force structure 
implications for Army leadership. 
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This Field Manual acknowledges that stability operations can and must occur 
across the spectrum of conflict.  From peacetime engagement with a partner nation and 
humanitarian relief, to UN-style peacekeeping operations, to COIN, major war, and post-
conflict reconstruction, the Army must be ready to perform the functions of stability 
operations.115  FM 3-07 also emphasizes the need for unity of effort with all involved, 
including U.S. government agencies, foreign governments, and non-government 
organizations (NGOs).  Of note, FM3-07 specifically identifies specific tasks for the State 
Department in post-conflict situations.  These tasks fall into several sectors: security, 
justice and reconciliation, humanitarian and social well-being, governance and 
participation, and economic stabilization and infrastructure.116  This delineation of 
responsibilities is important, because with FM 3-07 the Army, like the DoD, is careful to 
provide itself plausible freedom from blame if stability operations go badly.  However, 
the Army does identify many crucial and complicated areas in which is takes the lead and 
responsibility for task accomplishment.  FM 3-07 lists several specific tasks within each 
security sector in which the Army is participating: establish civil security, establish civil 
control, restore essential services, support governance, support to economic and 
infrastructure development, and information engagement.117  These sectors are similar 
and run parallel to those in which the Army expects the State Department to operate, but 
they are distinct.  Where they overlap, FM 3-07 often stresses that the military only takes 
initial actions, while civil authorities will conduct follow-on and long-term operations.   
3. The Debate: Specialized versus General-Purpose Troops 
The current written doctrine of the DoD and the Army demonstrate a clear 
emphasis on stability operations.  However, there still exists debate as to how to actually 
develop and conduct stability operations.  FM 3-07 supports one side of the debate: 
stability operations are simply another mission of the Army, and should be conducted by 
general-purpose forces.  “The foundations for Army operations conducted outside the 
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United States and its territories are reflected in the elements of full spectrum operations: 
continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks.”118  
As the Army needs to be prepared to conduct any and all of these operations at any time, 
it must structure itself and train to all of these tasks.  
On the other side of the debate are those who advocate a separate, specialized 
stability operations force.  A prominent example is Robert M. Perito’s book.  In it, he 
argues for a specialized force, consisting of “robust military forces specifically designed, 
trained, and equipped for such missions.”119  Finally, many of the tasks described in FM 
3-07 are specific, complicated, and generally enduring in nature.  In other words, stability 
operations are not easy.  Additionally, both DoDI 3000.5 and FM 3-07 acknowledge the 
reality that, “As the War on Terrorism progresses, U.S. ability to establish sustainable 
security in post-conflict societies will become more important, not less.”120  
Given all of this history, these instructions, and these realities, why has the U.S. 
chosen to endorse the general-purpose force, instead of a dedicated, trained, and properly 
equipped stability operations force?  Chapters III and IV will provide possible answers to 
this question, and more detailed rationale of those on both sides of the debate. 
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III. THE EXPLANATIONS: RATIONAL COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS OR ORGANIZATIONAL INTERTIA 
The lack of a standing, dedicated American stability operations force can likely be 
explained in some combination of two ways.  This chapter will discuss first that those 
involved in shaping the force structure of the Army are rational actors, have weighed the 
costs and benefits of establishing such a force, and have decided to use general-purpose 
forces in stability operations.  The costs and benefits of a specialized force will be 
analyzed with regards to military readiness, domestic politics, and international politics.  
Finally, an alternative explanation will be explored: organizational inertia within the 
Army makes the development of a stability operations force difficult and unlikely.   
A. MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS COSTS AND BENEFITS 
Military leadership has certainly considered the impact that the establishment of a 
specialized stability operations force would have on existing force levels, funding and 
expertise.  Using Perito’s vision, a stability operations force would require thousands of 
troops: perhaps a core consisting of Stryker brigade, and including Military Police assets, 
special police units, civil police, and judicial and penal experts.121  Any force hoping to 
replace local capacity for providing public security would have to be very large and well 
equipped.122  An examination of the military tradeoffs is important here, and can shed 
perhaps the brightest light onto the puzzle of the absence of a stability operations force. 
1. Military Effectiveness Benefits of Specialized Stability Operations 
Force 
The main argument for a specialized stability operations force is that such a force 
would be able to perform such functions better than a general-purpose force.  “The 
education of commissioned and noncommissioned officers is a key component of 
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stability operations. Preparation requires different skills and a different mindset from 
major combat operations.”123  To achieve proficiency in these skills, soldiers, especially 
non-commissioned officers and officers, must be properly trained at all levels.  This 
training includes “skills training; situational training exercises; field training exercises; 
combined arms live-fire exercises; mobility exercises; command post exercises; and 
simulation exercises to train commanders, staff, and units.”124  In order to accomplish 
this training, the Army must invest a great deal of time, both in the unit and the individual 
soldier.  “Obviously, the greater the time for preparation, the higher the probability of 
success.  Adequate preparation time is critical for the alerting, mobilization, 
predeployment, deployment, and combat employment of one’s forces.”125  A standing 
specialized force allows the Army to spend the time effectively.  That force would 
receive its training in advance of any conflict and in a focused manner.  The other 
general-purpose forces would be able to concentrate on their own offensive and defensive 
capabilities and not have to worry about an extra mission set. 
However, when these missions are accomplished by general-purpose troops, each 
unit must be quickly trained to a new mission prior to each deployment, and perhaps at 
the expense of general combat training.  A dedicated stability operations force would 
require much less time to prepare for their mission than, say, a conventional brigade 
combat team.  In warfare, this time is critical.  “In general, there is a great advantage in 
completing one’s mobilization and deployment before the enemy does.”126  As the 
“enemy” in a stability operations environment is the environment itself, the Army cannot 
afford to waste any time in preparation for engagement.  The Pakistan floods in August of 
2010 provide a prime example of an enemy that can be effectively countered by a 
stability operations force.  In this case, the enemy is both the environment and the 
Taliban in the areas devastated by floods.   
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Over the past year, Pakistan's army has succeeded in driving Taliban 
fighters out of key sanctuaries in South Waziristan and the Swat Valley. 
But the damage from the floods could jeopardize those gains, officials 
acknowledged, unless infrastructure is quickly rebuilt—an undertaking 
that will cost billions of dollars and will probably take years.127 
The people of that area are growing tired of a government that they see as 
ineffectual, and are turning more and more to the Taliban for help.128  A standing, trained 
stability operations force could have quickly come into the area (if requested by Pakistan) 
and helped the people there, thus denying an advantage to the enemy in that specific area 
at that specific time, but perhaps throughout the region by improving American relations 
and image. 
Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the importance of properly 
apportioning time and training.   
[R]isk exists in relation to preparation and planning for future stability 
operations. Unlike World War II, modern rapid decisive operations, such 
as were seen in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, no longer allow the luxury 
for detailed and complex planning efforts during the hostilities phase. In 
addition, the myopic nature of our nation makes it difficult to continue the 
current stability operations momentum once the immediate challenge 
fades.129 
These conditions have led to a Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT) suffering 
due to a “lack of coordination and oversight.”130  These PRTs are a primary tool used by 
U.S. and NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces to conduct 
stability operations in Afghanistan.  Their model will likely be used more often in the 
future.   
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Another benefit of establishing a standing stability operations force may be a 
simple demonstration of an understanding of the world as it is, instead of how the U.S. 
might wish it to be.   
As U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it, “It is hard to conceive 
of any country challenging the United States directly on the ground—at 
least for some years to come. Indeed, history shows us that smaller, 
irregular forces—insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists—have for centuries 
found ways to harass and frustrate larger, regular armies and sow chaos. . . 
. We can expect that asymmetric warfare will remain the mainstay of the 
contemporary battlefield for some time.131 
The DoD might be well served to embrace this new world.  One criticism of the 
American Army is that its leadership has “irreconcilable definitions of war,” leading to 
disagreement as far as how to plan and execute the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan.132  
The Army has not had a long history of strong policy guidance from above.  As recently 
as the beginning of the Iraq War, American policy-makers continued to fail to learn 
lessons from stability operations in past conflicts.  “Even the most powerful liberal 
democratic state can have a hard time establishing coherent policy when it comes to 
peacekeeping.”133  As the guidance in both DoD instruction 3000.5 and FM 3-07 are both 
fairly new, a specialized stability operations force would show an internalization of the 
publicly stated policy.  The generals would show a real embracement of the doctrine and 
intention to put it into practice.   
Even without a full embracement of stability operations, troops on the ground will 
still likely face situations requiring skills related to those operations.  Former Secretary of 
Defense Les Aspin expressed his concerns about parallel missions sets.  
People who are trained to be soldiers, are then told to be police officers 
and are retrained for that role.  But if the circumstances on the ground 
change, without a parallel shift in the mandate, it is up to the individuals to 
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determine when they are to react as police officers and when as soldiers.  
Aspin stresses that this is a terribly dangerous situation.134 
A standing stability operations force would have focus on its own actions, and 
how it fit into the Army’s general mission, allowing other forces to conduct offensive or 
defensive operations. 
Finally, anyone leading a military state-building endeavor must be aware of what 
David M. Edelstein calls the footprint dilemma.  He argues that while a large military 
force may initially be needed to quell a great deal of violence, this is not always the case.  
And the size of the force can generally get smaller as time wears on, and violence goes 
down.  The concern is that a military with a large footprint within a host nation can and 
generally does wear out its welcome much more quickly than a smaller, less intrusive 
force.  If an occupying force loses the support of the people it is theoretically there to 
protect, it will face a larger resistance.135  Ideally, a well-trained stability operations force 
could conduct operations and state-building with a smaller, lighter force than if general-
purpose troops were used.  
2. Military Effectiveness Costs of Specialized Stability Operations Force 
At present, the United States does not have a large, dedicated stability operations 
force.  Instead, it prefers to use general-purpose forces for such tasks.  FM 3-07 identifies 
stability operations as simply another mission, falling within the continuum of “Full 
Spectrum Operations.”136  Given the evidence above, it is important to examine the costs 
of establishing such a specialized force.   
One of the main arguments against a specialized stability operations force is that 
it is simply not required.  The Army Field Manual for stability operations stresses the 
need for all forces to be able to operate across the full spectrum of operations, including 
stability operations.137  The Army training manual elaborates on this point.   
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The future will be one of persistent conflict. Today’s operational 
environments are being shaped by multiple factors. These include science 
and technology, information technology, transportation technology, the 
acceleration of the global economic community, and the rise of a 
networked society. The international nature of commercial and academic 
efforts will also have dramatic effects. The complexity of today’s 
operational environments guarantees that future operations will occur 
across the spectrum of conflict.138 
Additionally, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, shows that a military force 
is almost always involved in stabilizing activities, but those activities do not always 
constitute the majority of effort. 
 
Figure 1.   Notional Operational Plan Phases Versus Level of Military Effort139 
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As shown in Figure 1, stabilizing activities are even present at the beginning of 
any operation plan, but those operations are only a very small part of the military focus 
and effort.  Generally, stabilizing activities would not start en masse until the operation is 
nearing the end of Phase III.  A specialized stability operations force would be well 
trained in stability activities, but may be lacking in the other facets of warfare.  This 
force, therefore, may not be needed for some time, and might not be the most efficient 
use of manpower and resources at the onset of a conflict.  Arguably, a specialized 
stability operations force would not be necessary, as perhaps the relief general-purpose 
forces could be trained up as the conflict wore on.  As discussed above, a specialized 
force would require a great deal of resources, both in funding and manpower that could 
possibly be better spent on the actual ongoing fight.   
Costs would likely be great even in an operation that more resembles a pure 
stability operation.  Recently, the Government Accounting Office conducted a study, 
comparing the actual costs of UN stability operations in Haiti and a hypothetical U.S.-
only operation with the same goals.  The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH) had a UN budget of $428 million for the first fourteen months of the 
operation.  Out of that total, the U.S. contributed $116 million.  The GAO then estimated 
that a similar operation conducted by only U.S. forces and civilian police would cost 
approximately $876 million.140  
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Figure 2.   Cost Comparison of Real UN and Hypothetical U.S. Missions in Haiti141 
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The GAO considered several factors when determining the military costs of a 
hypothetical U.S. operation in Haiti.  First, it assumed an active duty to reserve force 
ratio of 85 to 15.  Using an all-reserve force would cost an extra $477 million.  This 
increase comes from providing pay and benefits to all the reservists that would not have 
otherwise been activated.  Active duty pay is not calculated in the total costs of the 
hypothetical operation because those forces would be paid whether or not they were 
actively engaged in an operation.142  This particular data set is telling, and raises 
questions as to from where such a force would or could be pulled.  If a standing stability 
operations force were stood up from the regular Army, the troops would be getting paid 
whether they were needed or not.  And if they were activated reserves or National Guard, 
the costs of using them when needed would also be great.  General-purpose forces, while 
always on the government payroll, would also always be available for other, conventional 
fights. 
Additionally, the GAO considered two other factors concerning such a 
hypothetical operation in Haiti: a more rapid deployment and higher operational tempo. 
The U.S. military in Haiti could, if desired, outpace and have a heavier footprint than a 
UN force.  The GAO’s original cost estimates, in Figure 2, are based on a 180-day 
deployment and a U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff-estimated operational tempo of 1.5 out of 
three.  The GAO estimated that decreasing the deployment time to 60 days would 
increase costs by around $60 million, and increasing operational tempo to two out of 
three would incur an additional $23 million.143  
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Figure 3.   Costs of Hypothetical U.S. Operations in Haiti, with Variables144 
These cost comparisons again illustrate potential concerns when considering a 
standing stability operations force.  Such a force would ideally be able to deploy quickly 
and with a significant footprint.  If the Army were to fully employ the Powell Doctrine 
and only deploy with overwhelming force, such a stability operations mission, if it were 
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executed at all, would likely be quick and powerful.  The question that policy-makers 
would have to answer is whether or not such actions are worth the increased cost, or if it 
would be better to let the UN accomplish these missions.  A stability operations force 
could be seen by cost-counting politicians as the Army simply waiting and itching for 
such a mission, and might not deem it worth the cost. 
Finally, the separation of forces may create conflicting missions.  The American 
mission in Iraq and Afghanistan has been to both root out terrorism and to establish 
strong, sovereign governments.145  However, as American activities in Afghanistan and 
Iraq have made clear, “these two goals are not necessarily mutually reinforcing.  An 
ongoing anti-terrorist campaign layered on top of a state-building effort, or vice versa, 
may only complicate efforts to build effective state institutions.”146  A specialized 
stability operations force may complicate matters on the ground by weakening the unity 
of command and confuse all involved. 
B. DOMESTIC POLITICAL COSTS AND BENEFITS 
While military effectiveness costs and benefits are certainly important in the 
debate of using specialized vs. general purpose forces for stability operations, other 
factors are likely at play here.  The establishment of a standing stability operations force 
would be a major restructuring of the Army in particular and the DoD as a whole.  As 
discussed in Chapter II, the Army currently chooses to use general-purpose forces for 
stability operations.147  “[C]reating a U.S. Stability Force will require extensive 
congressional involvement, new authorizing legislation, and new funding.”148  Such a 
sweeping change would likely gain the attention of many pundits, and media outlets.  
Additionally, in the world of the Internet and social media, even the Army knows it can 
directly influence, and be influenced by, the general American public.  “The Army 
decided it was time to open up the lines of communication and further the conversation” 
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and stood up its new Online and Social Media Division at the Office of the Chief of 
Public Affairs in January 2009.149  Questions would be asked.  Why is this change being 
made now?  What does it mean?  How will this change affect military readiness?  How 
much will it cost?  Integral to this thesis are not the answers to these questions, but rather 
the fact that they are being asked in the first place.  The applicable issues in this paper are 
how the uncertainty behind them came to be and how it affects the decisions made by 
those involved with stability operations and force structure requirements. 
1. Domestic Political Benefits of Specialized Stability Operations Force 
The court of public opinion can be a powerful force.  Attitudes toward American 
involvement in stability operations have waxed and waned over the years.  During the 
1990s, survey data showed that the American public was “a generally supportive lot 
when it comes to U.S. participation in UN peace operations, in terms of both troop 
contribution and funding.”150  Despite an outcry after watching the body of an American 
soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, and the subsequent pull-out of all 
American troops, the U.S. still offered millions of dollars of aid and equipment to assist 
the UN in its efforts to establish some semblance of law and order in Somalia.151   
Demonstrations of American commitment to stability operations continue today, 
both in rhetoric and action.  Many politicians currently argue for a continued presence in 
Afghanistan, saying that setting a date for withdrawal would be an admission of defeat 
without getting the job done.152   
“We want to know that if we’re engaged in such activity where we are protecting 
our own country, we’re helping to protect our allies, we had better be in it for ... the long 
haul.” [Former Governor Sarah] Palin said “But we had better be in it to win it or, no, 
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we're not going to keep supporting this idea of sending innocents, our young men and 
women, America's finest, over there for some futile effort.”153 
Recent statements by the new Commander in Afghanistan, General David 
Petraeus, imply that most (if not all) of the Democratic leadership, including President 
Obama, shares this view.  
General Petraeus, who took over last month after Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal 
was fired for making disparaging remarks about civilian leaders, said he believed that he 
would be given the time and matériel necessary to prevail here. He expressed that 
confidence despite the fact that nearly every phase of the war is going badly—and even 
though some inside the Obama administration have turned against it. 
“The president didn’t send me over here to seek a graceful exit,” General Petraeus 
said at his office at NATO headquarters in downtown Kabul. “My marching orders are to 
do all that is humanly possible to help us achieve our objectives.”154  
Senator Lindsay Graham has expressed concern that politics on both the right and 
the left sides of the spectrum could undermine the war effort.  
You know what I worry most about: an unholy alliance between the right 
and the left," Graham said. “That there are some Republicans who are not 
going to take a, you know, do-or-die attitude for Obama’s war. There are 
some Republicans that want to make this Obama’s war. ... There will be 
some Republicans saying you can’t win because of the July 2011 
withdrawal date, he’s made it impossible for us to win, so why should we 
throw good money after bad? 
Graham added that liberals could also refuse to back the president’s plans in 
Afghanistan. 
“You’ve got people on the left who are mad with the president because he is 
doing exactly what [former President George W.] Bush did and we’re in a war we can't 
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win,” Graham said, adding: “My concern is that, for different reasons, they join forces 
and we lose the ability to hold this thing together.”155 
A standing stability operations force could serve to allay the fears of both the right 
and the left, and also serve both of their interests.  Such a force could signify both a 
commitment to finishing the job, and a resistance to simply relying on brute conventional 
military strength to accomplish America’s goals. 
Once again, the development of a standing, dedicated stability operations force 
could show a major change in the employment of American military forces.  As the 
Democratic Party currently controls both Congress and the White House, it may wish to 
distance itself even further from the Republican Party by demonstrating a departure from 
a contradictory GOP platform.  
Iraq demonstrated that it was impossible to separate regime change, which 
conservatives had generally supported, from nation building, which they 
rejected.  The post-invasion chaos that American troops confronted in Iraq 
and Afghanistan and the failure of the Bush administration to develop 
viable democratic institutions made it clear that a greater commitment was 
needed, in terms of money and manpower, to achieve the objectives that 
conservatives sought overseas.156 
The Bush administration’s policy promoting regime change helped to keep them 
in power in the 2004 U.S. elections, but “Democrats, after having run a campaign in 2008 
that defined itself in opposition to President Bush’s record […] found themselves in 




be making the most of this distinction.  As opposed to the 2002 or 2006 NSS, “The 2010 
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[NSS] also makes no mention of regime change, or similar “ending tyranny” -style 
remarks.”158   
2. Domestic Political Costs of Specialized Stability Operations Force 
Despite a change in administration and growing and developing strategies, a 
specialized force has yet to materialize.  Political winds may also be blowing against the 
establishment of such a force.  As stated above, the establishment of such a force would 
require significant funding.159  What is not clear, however, is from where such funding 
would be pulled.  The current NSS discusses improved readiness and shifting of priorities 
toward more “soft power” techniques, but makes no mention of any funding changes.160  
These questions complicate matters, and do not give the public (or the military itself) a 
clear picture of what actual national priorities are.  
An example of this is with WMD and nuclear proliferation, labeled the 
number-one threat since 2002; non-proliferation funding amounts to two-
tenths of one percent of defense spending. Is that the really the priority? 
Or is it fighting al Qaeda, the strategy for which occupies more space in 
the NSS than nonproliferation issues?...Again, what is the priority for the 
future force?”161  
Additionally, establishing a stability operations force might indeed create a focus 
and direction for the military, but it might not be one to which the public is receptive.  
While the American public has generally been supportive of deployment of stability 
operations, or peace operations, forces when clear national interests are present, these 
deployments are still subject to significant public debate.162  Then-candidate George W. 
Bush campaigned on decreasing American participation in stability operations and other 
military excursions around the world, often criticizing President Clinton’s policies on the 
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matter.163  And although President Bush won reelection in 2004, then-Senator Barack 
Obama, in 2008, also campaigned on ending at least one major American military 
operation overseas: the Iraq War.164 
President Obama’s campaign promises highlight a final reason that a major shake-
up of military force structure may not be politically beneficial.  Obama has arguably 
fulfilled his promise to end the war in Iraq by officially ending combat operations in 
August of 2010.165  However, he is drawing criticism from more liberal Democrats for 
increasing the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan.166  But perhaps of more importance 
is how little attention is being paid by the general public to operations in Afghanistan.  
This inattention is aided by politicians on both sides of the aisle who had their own 
motivations to keep the issue quiet.167  Democrats do not wish to undercut the President 
on foreign affairs, worrying that it will weaken him with regards to health care, a top 
Democrat priority.168  Republicans generally support Obama’s strategy, but do not want 
to openly support him, because they want to continue to make the argument that 
Democrats are weak on national security.169  A major revamp of military force structure 
would bring the war in Afghanistan into the headlines again. 
C. GLOBAL POLITICAL COSTS AND BENEFITS 
American military muscle is always flexed within full view of the world.  The 
policies and priorities exhibited by military action are watched and noted by friend and 
foe alike.  In order to better conduct stability operations the U.S. has looked to build 
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partner capacity and cooperation.170  The 2010 NSS “ostensibly seeks to build coalitions 
with strong international support and participation.”171 American policy-makers must 
understand what their decisions regarding a stability operations force signify to friends 
and foes alike.   
1. Global Political Benefits of Specialized Stability Operations Force 
As shown in Chapter II, the United States has a long history of participating in 
stability operations.  This commitment continues today.  In 2009, the U.S. had nearly 
50,000 troops involved in peace operations.  However, only a tiny number of these troops 
were involved in UN operations.172  This non-involvement comes at a time when U.S. 
monetary contributions to the UN has reached nearly $1.7 Billion in 2010, in addition to 
$2.1 for the U.S. State Department’s Contributions to International Peacekeeping 
Activities account.173  “Does this reluctance [to participate in non-U.S.-led stability 
operations] (and resulting non-involvement) deprive the international community of 
signals of political resolve that can be critical for the success of operations of geopolitical 
significance?”174  Such signaling is important for American interests, especially when it 
comes to stability operations.  Post-conquest military occupations are rarely successful; 
they only have a chance if the local population allows itself to be ruled (if temporarily) by 
an outside force.175   
Most significantly, the imprimatur of the United Nations appears to grant 
[state-building missions] legitimacy in the eyes of both the international 
community and the population of the territory that they control.  The 
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involvement of the UN, therefore, slows the rate at which a population 
becomes impatient with a foreign military presence and makes that 
population more willing to accept a larger and more intrusive footprint.176 
A dedicated stability operations force could help to bridge the gap with the UN.   
Such a force would not necessarily fall under the control of the UN, especially 
considering American resistance to allowing American forces to wear the blue helmet, 
both metaphorically and literally.177  This force would ideally be trained in the ways of 
the UN, allowing it to integrate well with those forces. 
Such gestures of goodwill and teamwork are important when considering the 
operations the U.S. is likely to face in the future.178  
Most historical nation-building operations have fallen into one of two 
categories. The first are peacekeeping missions mounted on the basis of 
prior agreement among the warring parties. The second are peace 
enforcement operations launched over the opposition of one or more of the 
indigenous factions. Interventions of the first type have typically been led 
by the United Nations, those of the second by a major global or regional 
power or by an alliance of such powers. Peace enforcement actions of this 
latter type have proved much more expensive than peacekeeping 
operations, and particularly so for the leading participants.179 
As the United States is generally a leading participant, it would be well served to do what 
it can to share the costs and burdens of future conflicts.   
Finally, the U.S. can help to garner good will among various peoples of the world, 
even when operating unilaterally.  Humanitarian operations and support are an important 
part of stability operations.  A standing force would be ready and trained to deploy 
quickly to help where needed.  American forces, well practiced from operations in 
Afghanistan, have provided a great deal of assistance in Pakistan following some of the 
worst flooding on record.  
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The American assistance has been considerable, it has been prompt, and it 
has been effective,” said Tanvir Ahmad Khan, a former Pakistani foreign 
secretary and now chairman of the Islamabad-based Institute of Strategic 
Studies. “The sheer visibility of American personnel and helicopters 
working in the field gives a feeling of very welcome assistance from the 
United States.180 
However, as described above, the assistance has not been enough, and allowed a 
resurgence of the Taliban in some areas.181  A standing, trained stability operations force 
could be ready to effectively and efficiently accomplish similar missions on short notice 
anywhere in the world, and would be even better prepared to thwart enemy progress than 
a general-purpose force, especially if that force had not been recently involved in stability 
operations. 
2. Global Political Costs of Specialized Stability Operations Force 
The establishment of a stability operations force by the United States might not be 
well received by the international community.  As described above, a standing stability 
operations force could be trained to work well alongside UN troops.  However, the U.S. 
still prefers to keep American troops under only American control.182  That way, 
American troops are not subject to UN rules of engagement or command and control.183  
Such preferences do not signal a great deal of cooperation or team building with the 
international community.   
Despite American reluctance to provide troops for the efforts, the UN has 
participated in many peace operations since its inception.184  However, the UN never 
intended for the great powers to participate in peace operations, and in fact openly 
discouraged such participation.185  The intention was to keep forces involved in peace 
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operations neutral, therefore keeping the operations themselves neutral.186  Such neutral 
operations were preferred for several reasons: including a greater likelihood of 
acceptance of troops by local populations and belligerents, lower possibility of politically 
controversial actions by troops involved, and a greater perceived plausibility of actual 
neutrality of action.187  The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) in Egypt was a 
precedent-setting mission for UN peace operations.  “One might plausibly say that the 
neutrality of the UNEF I force was a part of the ten-year success of the operation […]”188 
An American stability operations force may signal a greater desire to take on missions 
normally reserved for UN peacekeepers and forces, putting into question the potential for 
future success of military interventions.  As an initial proponent of UN peacekeeping, 
then-UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold clearly stated that neither states who have 
a vested interest in the conflict at hand, nor permanent members of the Security Council, 
should ever participate in peacekeeping missions.189  The international community may 
prefer the U.S. to maintain its role as a superpower and only use that power when 
traditional peacekeeping does not work, as happened in Bosnia.190  A standing stability 
operations force may signal American intentions to overstep its traditional bounds.   
D. AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION: ORGANIZATIONAL INERTIA 
Despite all of these influences on military policy and force structure, perhaps 
other factors are at play.  The United States Department of Defense is a colossal 
bureaucracy.  It currently employs more than 750,000 civilian employees and more than 
1.4 million active duty personnel.191  Out of those totals, nearly 290,000 civilians and 
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more than 566,000 active duty soldiers are in the Department of the Army.  Making 
major changes is quite a challenge in any system this large, where organizational inertia 
is the norm.192   
The assumption that states behave in a basically rational manner is of 
course an assumption, not an empirically tested insight.  Political scientists 
often assume high degrees of rationality, not because it is accurate, but 
because it is helpful: it provides a relatively simple way of making 
predictions, by linking perceived interests with expected behavior.193 
As an alternative to purely rational choice theory, this section will examine the 
influence organizational inertia has on force structure decisions regarding stability 
operations. 
As shown in Chapter II, American attitudes towards stability operations have 
swayed over the years.  Politicians, Army and DoD leadership have not been consistent 
with regard to stability operations.  Vietnam is a distant memory, if a memory at all, of 
Army leadership today.  More recent actions, they themselves of course shaped by 
memories and impressions of the past, likely hold more sway on the minds of today’s 
decision makers.  In the early 1990s, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine guided the actions 
of the military of first President Bush, and then President Clinton.  Under Bush, the 
military quickly and easily pushed Saddam Hussein’s forces out of Kuwait in a military 
action, that “just as Operation Just Cause in Panama, was a military action true to the 
criteria and spirit of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine.”194  Even the humanitarian relief 
mission in Somalia, at least at first, was guided by the principles of the Weinberger-
Powell Doctrine.  It was a powerful U.S.-led force with a clear initial mission and 
mandate, requested and assisted by the UN.  It was not until after the mission started that 
the waters really muddied for the U.S., with words like “nation building” and 
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“disarming” being tossed around.195 Such efforts resulted in the deaths of American 
soldiers in Mogadishu on 3 October 1993, and greatly affected the attitudes of both the 
DoD and Congress concerning matters of stability operations.196  “US/UN relations 
reached a nadir following the Somalia debacle in 1993, to the degree that the superpower 
virtually dissociated herself from the international body, thereby weakening the 
organization.”197 
These operations reinforced several impressions held by military leadership.  “US 
military officials believe that U.S. military forces should be held in reserve for the highest 
priority, war-fighting and conventional defense missions, and are concerned about the 
impact of peace support deployments on overall military readiness.”198  The leadership 
also feared open-ended commitments and unclear missions.  “A legacy from Vietnam, 
this anxiety was compounded by the ‘mission creep’ experienced in Somalia.”199  
Additionally, U.S. military leadership also stresses that American forces are already 
working hard around the world.  Their skilled efforts are already being put toward both 
kinetic warfare and logistic support to other stability operations, and “the demands of 
burden-sharing suggest that others should take the lead in [peace support operations].”200   
Finally, support for stability operations in general is certainly not universal.  Not 
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In addition, some analysts are skeptical that the problems of weak and 
failed states can be most dealt with through military and political 
interventions aimed at creating viable government institutions. The 
effectiveness of past efforts is a subject of debate, with differing views on 
the criteria for and the number of successes, draws, and failures, as is the 
best means to achieve success.201 
Even today, some question the both the ability of the military to resurrect a failed 
(or defeated) state, and the need for them to do so in the first place. 
U.S. national security depends most fundamentally on our economic 
strength. An open-ended commitment in Afghanistan demands vast 
resources better used at home and for purposes that contribute effectively 
to our security. It depletes our military and distracts our political 
leadership from more pressing challenges…. 
The current strategy is not working, and the administration has not 
identified the end-state it is seeking to achieve or the circumstances that 
would make withdrawal possible. The U.S. government emphasizes that 
withdrawal in summer 2011 will depend on conditions prevailing at the 
time. The current strategy and the stated timetable are out of synch; 
objectives need to be updated to realities on the ground to ensure that a 
drawdown in the summer of 2011 proceeds in a timely and effective 
manner.202 
Such attitudes clearly do not support a major force restructuring, resulting in a force 
dedicated solely to operations that are considered futile.  
The attitudes described above have held great sway over Army leadership, 
sometimes to the detriment of mission effectiveness.  “Despite decades of personal 
experience to the contrary, army officers have consistently underestimated the difficulty 
of unconventional warfare, military occupation, and pacification.  The price of this hubris 
has been high, in both the past and the present.”203  This hubris was reflected in Army 
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training and doctrine for years.  “During the late 1990s, it was almost mandatory that any 
briefing by a senior officer would show a slide juxtaposing German tanks with the 
Maginot Line as a warning of the dire fate that awaited should the nation not fund the 
army’s transformation program.”204  While the world has undoubtedly changed since 
then, and the some attitudes along with it, such memories have certainly not disappeared, 
as demonstrated above. 
While the lack of a standing stability operations force is likely due, in part, to 
these attitudes, the costs and benefits described earlier in this chapter certainly have been 
taken into account by various decision-makers.  The question still remains as to whether 
such a force could be created in a way that would fully address these costs and benefits.  
The next chapter will attempt to answer that question, and make recommendations for a 
standing stability operations force. 
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IV. STABILITY OPERATIONS FORCE REVISITED 
So far, this thesis has examined many factors influencing decision-makers 
concerning the development of a standing stability operations force.  The historical 
record, cost-benefit analysis, and organizational inertia have shaped the current force 
structure to varying degrees.  This final chapter will propose a framework for establishing 
a standing stability operations force.  This framework will address the influences 
described above.  It will embrace and build upon the advantages of such a force.  It will 
also address and mitigate the various concerns and problems associated with the 
establishment of a stability operations force.  Finally, this chapter will conclude the 
thesis, examining which are the least and most compelling reasons behind American 
resistance to the creation of this force. 
A. THE STANDING STABILITY OPERATIONS FORCE 
A standing, trained, equipped, and dedicated stability operations force could be a 
valuable tool of American diplomacy and military might.  This force would be trained to 
accomplish the various tasks that compose stability operations.  Its mission would be to 
use those skills and the strength of the U.S. military to accomplish the stability operations 
tasks lined out in the U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07.  This force would be prepared to 
provide forces that can deploy in a variety of situations, including following an invading 
force or a direct deployment into a failed or failing state.   
1. Size and Composition 
The bulk of this stability operations force would be a specialized Army force 
comprised of at least a division’s worth of units.  Robert M. Perito suggests that an 
existing structure could be the core of this new force: Stryker brigade combat teams 
(SBCT).  It is important that this force has real firepower, but is also light and 
maneuverable.  “The fact that the Stryker is transportable by C-130 aircraft means SBCTs 
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can arrive anywhere in the world within 96 hours from bases in the United States.”205  It 
also has its own infantry battalions and intelligence capabilities.206  All of these 
components, when trained consistently for stability operations missions, would be an 
agile, formidable force.  However, more capabilities are required.  Perito goes on to 
suggest adding significant numbers of military police, civilian police, and legal experts to 
round out the force and provide it more experience and skill in specific stability 
operations functions, such as law enforcement, preventing public disorder, and enforcing 
justice.207 
The size and skill sets of this force would do well to address the costs and benefits 
outlined in Chapter III.  This force would be powerful enough to be effective in a post-
conflict environment, but would be small and light enough to mitigate the problems 
caused by a heavy footprint, as it can perform the same functions of a much larger, 
general-purpose force.  This maneuverability also helps to show that the U.S. is not 
interested in occupying countries or overstepping its traditional bounds, as a more heavy-
handed force might.  Additionally, these forces could be trained to integrate quickly with 
UN peacekeepers, if so desired.  American stability operations forces could be deployed 
into an area requiring peace making or enforcement, where a stronger force is required.  
Once the situation has calmed down, the teams would be trained to hand off 
peacekeeping responsibilities to UN forces.   
2. Command and Control 
Key to the success of stability operations forces is their ability to operate in a 
joint, interagency environment.   
The very definition of stability operations raises the problem of how to 
command and control endeavors that are by nature Joint, interagency, and 
often multinational. Since the U.S. government will continue to conduct  
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stability operations, the U. S. defense establishment must develop a 
comprehensive view to integrate military land power with its interagency 
partners for these deployments.208 
A specially trained, standing stability operations force could be a first step in 
developing that integration.  Not only would all members of the force be trained (at least 
at the basic level) in the language of joint and interagency communication, but also the 
staff would consist of liaison officers of various stripes.  State Department/USAID, 
embassy, Department of Justice, and other agencies would require representation at the 
brigade level in order to provide the best coordination possible.   
Additionally, the coordination could extend out from the stability operations 
forces as well.  Officers trained and experienced in stability operations would hold billets 
in other Army units conducting offensive and defensive operations.  This placement 
would help the Army hold true to even the current Field Manual 3-07, and better enable 
all Army forces to operate all the way along the spectrum of conflict, including stability 
operations.  No unit operates in a bubble, and the stability operations liaison officer could 
help other Army units actually conduct these types of operations when necessary.  The 
liaison officer could also help to mitigate the problem of conflicting missions described 
in Chapter III.  Coordination is key to preventing (to the extent possible) sending mixed 
messages to the local population. 
3. Concerns 
A standing stability operations force would certainly not be without some 
problems.  First and foremost, it would not be cheap.  As stated above, sizeable numbers 
of troops and civilians would be required to provide even the most basic capabilities.  
Stability operations, by their very nature, tend to take significant amounts of times, often 
measured in years rather than months.  Three or four brigades would be required for each 
brigade required in the field.  While one brigade is deployed, one would be returning 
from a deployment, one would be training to deploy, and yet more soldiers would be 
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required to fill vacancies caused by injury, illness, schools, or soldiers leaving the Army.  
The question most concerning to the Army is where from where would the personnel and 
the funding required be pulled.  It is unlikely that the Army would receive a funding 
increase large enough to support this force, so it would be forced to cut costs elsewhere.  
Such cuts would not sit well with those who still hold the attitudes described in Chapter 
III, those who still invoke images of German tanks when imagining the greatest threats 
facing the United States today. 
Finally, what happens if the political winds shift?  Currently, as described in 
Chapter III, there is at least some support for stability operations as national security 
policy.  However, this may not always be the case in the future.  What happens to the 
forces that are trained to do a mission that the U.S. no longer values?  If the American 
people elect politicians favoring more isolationist policies, the first Army forces on the 
chopping block may be those that are not necessarily viewed as direct contributors to 
national security. 
These concerns, though real, can be overcome.  Congress must ask the Army hard 
questions about how its money is spent now.  Would it really be more expensive to 
establish a standing stability operations force?  Or is it more cost-effective to continue to 
train general-purpose forces to specific deployment tasks?  What is the actual impact to 
mission readiness?  Such questions are answerable if addressed honestly and without 
preconceived notions, but are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
B. SUMMARY 
The preceding chapters of this thesis have explored the basis of American 
resistance to establishing a specialized stability operations force within the Army.  Many 
reasons have been laid out, both for and against the creation of such a force.  This final 
section will analyze the most and least compelling reasons for this resistance and 
conclude the thesis. 
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1. Most Compelling Reasons Against a Standing Stability Operations 
Force 
Military readiness is (ideally) always at the forefront of decision makers’ minds.   
The concerns raised in Chapter III about the costs of establishing a stability operations 
force are very real, and may have a very real impact on the ability of the Army to defend 
the U.S. and its interests.  More specifically, the attitudes in Section 4 of Chapter III can 
compound and distort the true costs and benefits of a stability operations force.  As 
shown above, these costs might be mitigated, but results of any study must be closely 
scrutinized to determine if, in fact, it was conducted without bias or preconceived 
notions.  If the results are fair, they could be used either to enhance or scrap the stability 
operations force proposed in this chapter. 
2. Least Compelling Reasons Against a Standing Stability Operations 
Force 
The political costs described in Chapter III have a role to play in American 
resistance to a stability operations force, but it is a smaller role than military readiness.  
Political winds, both international and domestic, shift often and for many different 
reasons.  The Army, by design, follows the orders and direction of elected/appointed 
civilian leadership.  However, the career DoD civilians and generals have all served 
through multiple administrations and have seen those winds blow one way or the other.  
While not immune to these winds, the Army, as described above, is a giant bureaucracy 
and is unlikely to move much on the whims of popular opinion.   
3. Conclusion 
This thesis has established the question regarding a standing stability operations 
force, explored the historical context of such a force, analyzed several reasons both for 
and against its establishment, and offered a framework for a potential force using the 
lessons learned from all the above reasoning.  The United States has not yet established a 
standing stability operations force.  Whether or not it ever will remains to be seen.  
However, it is clear that the stability operations missions (or those like them) are not 
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likely to disappear any time soon, and that the U.S. Army will have critical role to play in 
those operations.  Whatever course the Army leadership chooses, it is important that it 
recognizes clearly the influences to which it is subject, and makes decisions accordingly, 
with national interests in mind. 
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